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THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE AND THE QUEST
FOR AN ABSOLUTELY JUST SOCIETY
ROBERT WAELDER
Dr. Robert Waelder is one of a very select group of lay analysts accepted by the Psychoanalytic
Association to practice psychoanalysis. A native of Vienna, Austria, he acquired a Ph.D. in physics
from the University of Vienna in 1922. At the same time he studied with the Vienna Psychoanalytic
Association, becoming a member in 1924. He gave his first course at the Psychoanalytic Institute the
following year and stayed in that teaching position until the Nazi overthrow of Austria in 1938.
During these years he worked closely with the late Dr. Sigmund Freud.
Dr. Waelder came to the United States in 1938. Since that time he has lectured at the Boston
Psychoanalytic Institute and the Bryn Mawr College Department of Social Economy. He has also
worked with the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Institute, the Institute of Philadelphia Association for
Psychoanalysis, and the Philadelphia State Hospital. Since 1961 he has been a Group Leader in the
Center of Advanced Psychoanalytic Studies in Princeton.
Dr. Waelder was appointed Professor of Psychiatry (Psychoanalysis) by the Jefferson Medical
College in 1963. He has written numerous articles for periodicals both in this country and abroad,
and a textbook, Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis;his most recent book, PsychoanalyticAvenues to Art,
was published last May.
The present paper was presented at the 1965 Judicial Conference of the Third (Federal) Judicial
Circuit of the United States in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on September 9. It will appear as a chapter in Dr. Waelder's forthcoming book, Progress and Resolution: A Study of the Issues of Our Age.
Dr. Waelder analyzes the factors that stand in the way of achieving absolute justice in a world of
human frailties; he concludes that nothing approximating it is attainable and, consequently, we must
adjust to something considerably short of absolute justice.-EnIoR.

The demand for justice, for more and more
justice, for absolute justice, is in the center of the
sentiments of our time. We read every day in our
papers what injustices are committed here and
there in every part of the globe and that it is our
responsibility to set things right, or else there will
be most dire consequences. This is a rather novel
attitude.
Of course, it has been held since ancient times
that iastitia fundamentum regnorum--that justice
is the foundation of kingdoms. But that meant
essentially justice in the conflicts between individuals or small groups within the established social order. It did not mean to challenge the existing
social stratification as such.
The idea that the social stratification itself has
to be just, i.e., has to comply with an abstract
concept of justice, is fairly new, probably not more
than about two hundred years old.
During the recent student rebellion in Berkeley,

one of the participants was reported as saying
that the students wanted a society of justice and
brotherhood. His formulation was essentially
identical with one given by Maximilien Robespierre in his speech on June 7, 1794. It was the goal
of the regime, said Robespierre "de fonder sur la
terre l'empire de la sagesse, de la justice et de la
vertu"h-to establish on earth the empire of wisdom,
justice and virtue.
The two statements differ slighly in the style
of expression; Robespierre uses some words which
sound dated to us. The word "wisdom" is not
fashionable today and we prefer to speak of "reason" or "sanity." "Virtue" is altogether antiquated; we would rather say "brotherhood." But
the ideas are substantially identical.
What really is justice? This is something about
which people have always agreed as long as one
remained on a highly abstract level; they have always disagreed as soon as one got down to concrete
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details. Suum cuique-to each his due-is the
Roman formulation of justice. The digest of Roman law prepared on order of the Emperor Justinian in the middle of the 6th century A.D., the
so-called Institutiones, begins with the words:
"Justice is the constant and earnest will to
render to every man his due."
So far it is easy to agree. But what is every man's
due? If we turn, for instance, to the greatest thinker
of antiquity-to Aristotle-we hear the following:
"It is thought that justice is equality and so it
is, but not for everybody but only for those
who are equal; and it is thought that justice is
inequality, for so indeed it is, though not for
everybody, but for those who are unequal."
Justice thus means for Aristotle to treat unequal
things unequally.
This concept can serve to justify practically
everything. One can justify slavery in these terms
and that is in fact what Aristotle has done.
In later times, one took a different view of the
matter. Justice was no longer considered to be the
unequal treatment of things which are unequal by
nature (or social conditions), but the equal treatment of all men regardless of how unequal they
may be in terms of nature or social conditions.
Justitia, the Goddess of justice, was depicted as
blindfolded; she would give her verdict without
regard of person, equal for the mighty and the
weak, for the rich and the poor.
In more modem times, a still different view has
more and more taken hold, viz, that the Goddess of
justice should not be blindfolded at all, but should
be made to see again so that she may differentiate
between the people in a way opposite to that envisaged by Aristotle, compensate for the inequalities of nature and social situation and give
preferential treatment to the weak, the sick, the
poor-to the "disinherited of the earth" as they
have sometimes been called.
Social justice is often viewed as equal opportunity for all. But here, too, we face a variety of possible interpretations. We may perhaps hold that it
means equal opportunity for human beings as they
are now; all should have equal access to the good
things of life-for instance, receive equal consideration for employment or promotion-regardless of family origin, race, ethnic, extraction
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religion, sex, and the like. This is one interpretation.
A second interpretation may hold that this is not
justice at all because there are vast differences in
previous education; in order to make things just,
all would have to have equal education first.
A third interpretation goes still further. It is
pointed out that equal schooling is not sufficient to
make conditions really fair and equal, because
there are vast differences in the home situation of
people. Formal education is received by youths who
are differently equipped, depending on whether
or not they had received stimulation in their
homes, had a good home atmosphere, adequate
objects of identification, and so forth.
And finally, there is a fourth view that would
argue that even if this were equal, too, there still
would be no equality of opportunity because people have been equipped differently by nature:
some, for instance, are in sturdy health, others are
sickly; some have been endowed with high intelligence, others with low; some are attractive,
winning immediately the goodwill of people, others
are not, etc. Not until all natural endowment is
equal, or its inequalities properly compensated
for, can we speak of real equality of opportunity.
One can readily see that as we proceed in this
sequence of interpretations, the ideal of equality
of opportunity gradually turns into an ideal of
equality of station.
It seems to me that the concept of social justice
is today oscillating between the poles of equality
of opportunity and equality of station, between the
ideal that all people should participate in the race
of life on equal terms, and the ideal that they
should all arrive at the same spot at the same time.
If the latter is to be achieved, if all are to arrive
at the target together, it must be a race of differential handicaps.
One can also see that this question of equality of
opportunity versus equality of station is related to
the question of liberty and equality, because
equality of opportunity implies liberty.
Liberty and equality have been coupled together in the slogan of the French Revolution and
have remained so in the consciousness of countless
people ever since.
Nevertheless, it is easy to see that there are
instances in which liberty and equality interfere
with each other. If, for instance, people are free to
engage in acquisitive activities, it will soon turn
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out that some will be more prosperous than others;
if we want them to be equal in income and possessions, we must prevent them from engaging in
such activities, or determine the rewards they are
permitted to receive or to keep. If people are free
to choose the neighborhood in which they live, and
the circles in which they move, there will soon be
a social differentiation of residential neighborhoods
and social circles; if we want to prevent this from
happening, we must reduce, or cancel out, the
freedom of choosing one's neighborhood or one's
circle.
How did it happen that liberty and equality
have so long been considered as brothers when they
are actually antagonists? The answer to this question should not be too difficult.
There is an area of life in which liberty and
equality actually go together, and an area of life
in which they do not go together.
For a group of oppressed--say, for slaves who
want to be emancipated from slavery-liberty and
equality mean actually the same. They want to be
free from their masters and equal to their masters;
that means the same to them.
As soon as one extends the concept of liberty
from the relations of the lower to the higher
eschelons into the relations within the peer group;
as soon as liberty does not only mean freedom from
the domination by the master but also freedom in
the inter-relations within one's group, liberty and
equality become irreconcilable because freedom
within the peer group will immediately lead to
social differentiations. If this is to be prevented,
liberty must be curtailed.
A simple example from daily life may serve to
illustrate the point. There may be a group of
children at a birthday party. If they are left free,
without adult supervision, there will soon be some
who will dominate and others who will follow,
some who will determine 'what games are to be
played and who will allocate the more desirable
roles in these games to themselves and to their
friends, and others who will have to take what
remains. If we want them to be equal, to have all
the same influence in the choice of the games, and
all the same chance of occupying the desirable
places in them, an adult must be there to supervise
the proceedings and to lay down the law and restrict the freedom of some of the children. Equality
inevitably demaius authority which constantly
interferes whenever in the free play of forces
social differentiation appears.
It is noteworthy that the situation, simple

though it is, has been rarely faced. Thomas Jefferson was well aware of it. And Goethe wrote
shortly after the French Revolutioh:'
"Legislators and revolutionaries who promise equality and freedom at the same time are
either dreamers or charlatans."
In the beginning of our century George Santayana
said: "The only free man in a social democracy"social democracy is Santayana's term for an egalitarian society--"the only free man in social democracy will be one whose ideal was to be an
average man."
Such voices, however, are rare, and the confusion persists in public consciousness.
It is possible to inculcate through education the
kind of conscience that demands sharing. In that
case, the authority necessary to counteract the
emergence of stratification becomes internal,
within the person, rather than external; outside
pressure would be needed only in the beginning
during the childhood years, while this education
and indoctrination is taking place, and might
relax later. But this kind of conditioning, while
effective with some people all the time, and with
most people some of the time, does not work with
all the people all the time; external authority
ready to interfere must remain as sdtima ratio to
insure compliance. Moreover, an internalized
demand to love others like oneself, if effective, is
hardly equally effective with regard to all objects;
its effectiveness is likely to diminish the more we
move away from an inner circle like family, party,
nation, etc.
Pertinent to this problem is the so-called pecking
order of animals, a universal phenomenon of nature. In groups of animals, a social order or hierarchy establishes itself. The zoologist, SchjelderupEbbe, discovered nearly half a century ago that a
kind of social hierachy exists among chickens:
There is a top animal that pecks everybody else
in the flock with impunity; the victim does not
resist but suffers it to happen, although it must
often be very painful and may on occasions be
fatal. Then, there is another hen who is being
pecked by the top bird but pecks everybody else,
and so forth down the line to the "buck private"
who is pecked by everybody and does not peck
anybody else. Schjelderup-Ebbe saw in these
conditions the prototype of social stratification
and called it a "pecking order."
It is not always as simple as with. chickens.
Chickens have one of the more tyrannical and more
rigidly stratified societies. In other instances things
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are more complex and the hierachy is a matter of
relative statistical frequency, of a quotient of
pecking versus being pecked, rather than a
strict line of command and obedience. Sometimes
there are circular orders: A pecks B, B pecks C,
and C pecks A. There are all kinds of complications
just as they are found among humans, too.
In general, one may sum up the essential points
of this research in approximately these terms:
There are several criteria of social hierarchy;
some have to do with preferred access to desirable
things, another with the possibility of using the
other ruthlessly as a means to one's ends.
The superior animal has, first of all, preferred
access to food. It feeds first; others do not touch the
food before the dominant animal is fully satiated.
If supplies are scarce, they may get nothing.
Second, there is preferred access to the sexual
object. If the big male is around in a group of
baboons, the bachelor males are practically
condemned to celibacy; they do not dare come
close. If the big male is not there, they may take a
chance.
Third, there is preferred access to safety. In
danger, the dominant animal can escape first. It
was about this way in the "Titanic" disaster when
more men were saved in first class than children in
third.
Finally, there is the possibility to abuse others
with impunity; this is the case of pecking which
was discovered first and gave the whole system its
name.
By and large, all these criteria coincide; i.e.,
those who are dominant according to one criterium
are so according to the others too. But there is one
important exception: one of the criteria of hierarchy, the preferential access to safety, is in
contradiction with another feature also found in
hierarchy, viz, that of leadership. A leading animal
does not escape first in danger; rather, it goes
ahead of the flock, exposing its body to danger
first and permitting the rest to take cover behind
it. This point makes the difference between genuine leadership and mere dominance.
Dominance in the animal kingdom depends on a
variety of factors; among them are health, physical
strength, age, and sex. In most mammals the male
is dominant except for the time of oestrus in which
dominance may shift to the female. Pugnacity and
courage are also important factors. A smaller
animal who is an excellent fighter may be dominant
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over a physically stronger one. The ability to
bluff has also something to do with it. And so has
closeness to home territory.
Hierarchy among humans seems to manifest itself in fundamentally similar terms though, of
course, with many more variations and complications.
After this cursory glance at phenomena of the
animal kingdom, we may return to our question:
where does justice lie? Does it lie in sanctioning the
order established in the free play of forces, as it is
rooted in nature or in individual or collective
history, or does it lie in correcting and changing
the natural order either wholly or partially?
Should we allow to those who have occupied the
top places more than the others, or the same, or
less?
There are various answers to these questions
and the views change with time, place, and circumstance.
In any case, we must realize that if we feel that
justice demands compensating for the inequalities
of the natural order, authority is needed to carry
this compensation out and to maintain it against
the constant pressures of the natural order to
re-assert itself; and the further we wish to go in
correcting the natural order, the more authoritarian the regime has to be.
Once again, where does justice lie? A few examples may help to show how difficult it is to answer
the question in concrete cases, and how impossible
to give a general answer which would be satisfactory to all.
Should one, for instance, educate highly gifted
children in the same classes with less gifted ones, or
should one place them in separate classes? If we
do the latter, we give them opportunity to progress
faster, at their own speed, and to realize their
abilities better. On the other hand, such a set-up is
humiliating for the other children who know
quite well that they do not belong to the elite.
They are stigmatized. If all are put together in the
same classes, the stigma is avoided at the price of
handicapping the development of the more gifted
ones. Where does justice lie?
Let us assume that a couple has three normal
children and one retarded one. Perhaps, by denying
their three normal children a college education,
they may be able to provide for their retarded child
such smecial remedial trainina as will make the
difference between permanent institutionalization
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and a restricted life outside of institutions. Which
course is just? Different people will take different
views of this matter.
In the simplest possible form the question
appears in the family between two brothers of
different, but not too different ages-perhaps two
or three years apart. It often happens that the
younger brother wants to go along with the older
brother, to join in the games the latter is playing
with his group; he thinks he is old enough. But
the older brother takes a different view of the
matter; he thinks the kid brother does not belong
in his crowd and would merely disturb the fun. In
a certain sense one can say that every older brother
is naturally a segregationist, every younger brother
an integrationist.
Where exactly does justice lie?
The simple fact is that every solution involves
sacrifices for some. Who shall sacrifice what for the
sake of 'whom is a question to which I see no clear,
unambiguous, moral answer.
For this reason, it would appear as the first
result of our considerations that an absolutely just
order cannot exist, in fact cannot be devised;
not only because people are morally imperfector sinful, if you like-but simply for the reason
that there is no agreement as to what justice is and
no likelihood of there ever being a complete agreement. There will always be situations in which one
man's justice is another man's outrage.
Second, the demand for absolute justice which
is so strong in this day and age, adds to the difficulties of the situation rather than diminishing
them. As long as we look upon such conflicts-as
between older and younger brother, or between
the gifted and the average, or the average and the
retarded, child-as conflicts of interests only, they
can be adjusted with charity. But once we ideologize and moralize them and see them as conflicts
between Good and Evil, they become inacessible
to compromise and thus insoluble, with nothing
but violence left.
It seems to me that the demand for absolute
justice, the very evangelical fervor of our time,
inakes all problems insoluble, with violence the only
possible outcome, noble though the idea is in the
abstract.
The French poet, Paul Val6ry said once that
. . every doctrine, every sentiment, if carried
pedantically to its ultimate conclusion, must lead
to the destruction of man".

Now let me offer some suggestions regarding
the historical significance of the modern movement.
It seems to me that what we are witnessing today
is a change in moral concepts.
All morality is a restriction and modification of
natural man. If man were good by nature, no
morality would be needed; he would always want
to do what he should do-a state of affairs that
ancient writers like Ovid attributed to a mythical
golden age of the past, but which has not existed
in historical time.
Victorian morality and the morality of many
earlier ages put the emphasis on the restriction of
sexuality. In the Victorian age, to be moral meant
for a woman never to have been touched by a man
except her husband. For a man, it did not mean
exactly that; but it still meant a considerable
degree of discretion. On the other hand, the
Victorian age had little compunction against war
and accepted it more or less as one of the facts of
life. Social stratification with enormous distance
between the highest and the lowest was equally
accepted; in the magnificent large English country
homes, a maid quartered in the top floor did not
even have each a bed to herself.
In our day, things have completely turned
around. Sexuality is now considered as practically needing no restriction whatsoever. On the
other hand, the expression of aggression in fighting,
and the mitigated expression of aggressiveness in
the form of status differentiation-one man
considering himself as better than another man
and looking down on him-is absolutely and completely condemned. The change is from a form of
morality that restricted sexuality while making
generous allowance for aggression, to a form of
morality that is permissive to sexuality but outlaws aggression.
Only those whose youth was still cast in the
Victorian or Edwardian age can fully realize the
magnitude of the change. Only half a century
ago, at the beginning of the First World War in
1914, the British Minister of War, Field Marshall
Lord Kitchener, said in his order to the British
Expeditionary Force which every soldier had to
carry in his pay book on his body and which
formulated the rules of conduct for the soldier:
"In this new experience you may find temptations
both in wine and women. You must entirely resist
both temptations and, while treating all women
with perfect courtesy, you should avoid all inti-
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macy." Thus, the head of the British Army asked
soldiers in wartime in all earnestness never to
touch any woman. Anything of the kind would
seem absurd today.
On the other hand, I may quote from a recent
article which dealt with topless bathing suits.
The author found it preposterous that anybody
should take objection to them on the ground of
public morals. Breasts are an organ of the body;
why should any organ be obscene? What is really
obscene, he argued, is for one man to call another
man a "nigger."
We can see here the change in the meaning of
"obscenity" from a term of opprobrium for certain sexual expressions to a term of opprobrium
for an expression of aggressiveness. It is a radical
shift of emphasis.
The recent revolt of students at the Berkeley
campus of the University of California broke out
when the Board of Regents refused the students
the use of College grounds for the preparation of
sit-ins in the community of Berkeley. These sit-ins
were obviously related to the current Negro movement. The last act in the series of events, on the
other hand, was an episode in which a group of
students shouted Anglo-Saxon four-letter words for
some time.
It seems to me that these two events, the first
and the last act, are closely interrelated; they are
the two sides of the same coin-a newly emerging
morality that has no objection to any kind of
sexual expression at all but objects strenuously
to any degree of aggression or social differentiation.
I submit that both moral stances-the Victorian attitude trying to wipe out sexuality, and
the present attempt to wipe out all aggressiveness-are equally unrealistic in that they try to
change human beings beyond the capabilities of
the flesh. The attempt to make all people chaste
has failed. The attempt at introducing total
equality will eventually fail as well.
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In both instances, the repressed returns: that
side of human nature to which the moralists of
one or the other persuasion wish to deny any
place finds ways of seeping through the barriers.
In the Victorian age, the attack against sexuality
did not really obliterate or totally subdue the sexual
aspect of man. It came out in other ways; in
hypocritical behavior, in perversions, in hysterical
symptoms so frequent at the time, and in other
forms besides.
The attempt at wiping out all aggressiveness
including the moderated and mitigated expression
of aggressiveness in the form of status differentiation, does not succeed any better because
aggressiveness, too, turns up somewhere through
the back door.
As had been mentioned before, an egalitarian
society needs an authority which has the power
to enforce equality and which sees to it that
nobody gets out of line. In this indirect way, the
attempt at wiping out the power of man over man
and to achieve complete equality actually leads to
the setting up of an authoritarian rule; with it,
the power of man over man has returned. Those
who started out to eliminate every differentiation
between people end up, inevitably, by creating
greater differentiations than have existed before.
We may remember the words of Horace; Naturain
expellas furca, tamen usque recurret-you may
drive nature out with a pitchfork; she will always
return.
Some day, of course, the present exaggerated
demands will exhaust themselves, as the exaggerated demands for the restriction of sexuality
have exhausted themselves. But if previous history
is any guide, I doubt whether this will happen until men will have embraced another fanaticism
because, as the late Sir Richard Livingstone, ViceChancellor of Oxford once said, "Men can rarely
walk in the middle of the road. They reel drunkenly
from the ditch on the one side to the ditch on the
other".

